Information domains and the analysis of distributed morality in "always onlife" information societies

We ask whether the three domains proposed in Information Domains (individual, social, and signification) can provide a useful framework for analyzing distributed morality (DM) and its potential consequences. DM is present when moral responsibility is distributed across human and artificial agents. The affordances of information and communications technologies (ICTs) have inten- sified interaction between human and artificial moral agents, which has in turn fundamentally altered our concepts of morality and its agency. 21st century moral responsibility is increasingly distributed across human and artificial agents. In our 'always onlife' world, all actions can be combined into good or evil results without human review or recourse. The inclusion of artificial moral agents problematizes the assumption of traditional ethics that agency (and therefore, accountability) is either individual or social. In artificial agents, we witness the re-ontologization of both the infosphere and the ecosphere. Artificial intelligence is a form of re-ontologized signification that may be said to influence or even pre-determine human moral decision-making. Artificial agents may perform actions that have moral consequences, but can we hold them accountable for these consequences? What does that even mean